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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
federal governmental support of religion are minor, indeed even
relatively trivial. Spread over a period of 160 years since the
First Amendment was adopted, they are insignificant. Massive
in comparative significance, I submit, is the record of non-support
by Congress during that period. In these 160 years Congress has
been subsidizing practically every form of American private endeavor except religion. Vast sums have been appropriated for
every form of secular education, including, inter alia, nautical
education, nurses' training, home economics, agricultural arts,
etc.' 6 Yet, in this entire period, Congress has never enacted a
measure for the non-preferential support of religion or church
schools. Indeed, as far as I know, such a bill has never even been
introduced into Congress. 'When efforts were made to obtain
federal funds for transportation to church schools or similar
auxiliary benefits, they were never justified on the ground that
non-preferential aid to church schools is constitutionally permissible. On the contrary, they were always justified on the claim
that the measures did not aid church schools-except, perhaps,
indirectly-but the children.17 This 160 year record, I submit, is a
practical construction of the First Amendment far more cogent
than the sporadic, minor incidents of support such as Presidential
Thanksgiving proclamations or adding "So help me God" to aa
official oath.
DR O'NEILL'S REBUTTAL
The fragments from the religious history of colonial times
which Dr. Pfeffer presents are illustrative of the religious intolerance of that period, and this intolerance resulted largely
from the activity and influence which were characteristic of established religions in all countries at that time. These fragments
from colonial history may offer part of the explanation of the widespread opposition to an establishment of religion, either in a
state, or for the United States as a whole, but they contribute
little to the interpretation of the specific language of the Constitution which was written and adopted after considerable debate and
discussion by the men in the First Congress of the United States.
-When Dr. Pfeffer finally gets around to a mention of the deliberations of the First Congress, instead of discussing its work, its
concept of the job it had to do on this particular matter, and the
purpose of the establishment clause as discussed then and there,
he brushes it all aside with the strange remark, ,I have elsewhere
set forth the reasons for my belief that these debates and proposals
16. Mitchell, Religion and Federal Aid to Education, 14 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PRoB. 113 (1949).
17. Ibid.
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do not sustain the contention [that the First Amendment bars
only preferential aid], and it is not necessary to repeat them."
If Dr. Pfeffer thought he found any valid evidence in the work
of the First Congress to support his position in this debate, it is
unfortunate that he did not present it here. However, I am
thoroughly familiar with the article in the Chiicago Law Review
to which he refers. But since the material of that' article is not
submitted here, and since space is limited, I must refrain from
discussing its many errors of fact and interpretation. The article
is primarily to be deplored because of its detailed attempt to
bring religion into a discussion of a constitutional question on
which neither Dr. Pfeffer's religion nor mine, nor that of others,
has any legitimate bearing.
His remarks about "Catholic spokesmen," "sectarian circles,"
"The support of the Catholic Church," "the position of the
Catholic Church," and his comments on the cases of Bradfield v.
Roberts,1 and Quick Bear v. Leupp,2 which involved Catholic institutions, are all erroneous. Further, he does me too much honor in
referring to the regular, constant, historical interpretation and
application of the establishment clause by all Presidents, all Congresses, the leading scholars in Constitutional Law, the Founding
Fathers (especially Madison and Jefferson), and all relevant
Supreme Court decisions, except the McCollum decision, as the
O'Neill thesis. In his article Dr. Pfeffer mentions the O'Neill
thesis 17 times, the O'Neill school 17 times, and the O'Neill theory
5 times. He even remarks that "Corwin follows O'Neill"! The
fact is that O'Neill follows Corwin, respectfully and with great
admiration.
Dr. Pfeffer is quite inaccurate in his statement that "Virginia
defeated a bill which would have required all to contribute to the
support of some religion or in lieu thereof to education." The bill
to'which Dr. Pfeffer is here referring was the bill to establish
Christianityas the state religion of Virginia instead of the Anglican
church. It was defeated by Madison's great Memorial and Rem onstrance in which Madison characterized the bill he was arguing
against, as an effort to "establish Christianity in exclusion of all
other religions." It was a bill giving a preferred and exclusive
status to Christianity and as such it was a clear instance of "an
establishment of religion" for Virginia. The fact that the individual taxpayer could, if he wished to, take the trouble to specify
that his taxes should go to educati6n instead of to the Christian
religion, did not cancel the fact that this was an exclusive privilege
1. 175"U. S.291 (1891).
2. 210 U. S. 50 (1908).
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for the teachers of Christianity, and excluded the teachers of any
and all other religions. I am confident that if today anyone should
propose such a bill to support the teachers of Judaism or Catholicism or Protestantism Dr. Pfeffer would join me in opposing such
a bill as a special privilege of the government to one religious
group, and as such a violation of the clear intent and purpose of
the establishment clause of the First Amendment.
Many of Dr. Pfeffer 's comments on the Constitutional Convention are irrelevant to this debate. It is a fact that the Constitution
did not mention God, and that it did provide that no religious test
should ever be required as a qualification for 'office under the federal government. But neither of these facts is in dispute, and
neither of them determines the meaning of the establishment
clause.
The heart of Dr. Pfeffer's argument consists of a number of
sweeping assertions for which he offers no evidence whatever, and
which, in effect, are assumptions which are equivalent to his total
position in this debate. In other words, it appears that one of Dr.
Pfeffer's basic techniques is the old fallacy known as "begging
the question." He assumes that which he should prove and then
offers considerable data and documentation to substantiate items
concerning which there is no controversy whatever. For instance,
he mentions "the principle-implicit in the constitution of 1787
and explicit in the amendment of 1791-that government has no
power to legislate in the domain of religion, either by restricting
its free exercise or providing for its support." Clearly, there is
no implicit principle to the Constitution that "government" has
no power to legislate in the domain of religion. There was implicit
in the Constitution, as argued by Hamilton and agreed to by Miadison and Jefferson, that the federal government had no power to
limit the personal freedoms, the civil liberties, of the people of the
states. That implicit limitation of the federal government was
expressed in words in the Bill of Rights to make explicit there
that the federal government could not violate the basic freedoms
of the people, or enforce what Jefferson called "civil incapacitations" on the people of the states who did not conform to a particular religious code or form of worship which had the support
of the federal government.
Dr. Pfeffer uses frequently in his argument the thoroughly
ambiguous phrase "separation of religion and government," or
"separation of Church and State." If the men who wrote and
adopted the First Amendment, and the generations of Presidents,
Congresses, Supreme Court Justices, and legal scholars who interpreted and applied it for some 160 years, knew. what the First
Amendment meant, then it was only a verbalization of the already
274
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existing separationbetween the federal governmewt and the state
governments. He says "If separation is conceived as the lack of
power on the part of Government to intervene in religious affairs,
support of religion is violative of the principle of separation even
if all sects agree upon the manner of sharing the State's favors."
The First Amendment is not concerned with the power of Government, it is concerned with the activity of the Congress of the
United States, which is a more limited area than that of government. There is no principle of separation in the First Amendment
concerning the relations of religion and government except that
which is plainly expressed in clear, literate, and specific language,
viz: that Congress can make no law respecting (which means about
or concerning, either for or against) an establishment of religion
or prohibiting the free exercise of religion. This is the American
type of separation of Church and State. It is the only type of
separation between religion and government that has ever had
constitutional approval of the Americai people. I do not know of
any American who is opposed to it. Dr. Pfeffer submits that "the
conceptual foundation of the relationship between church and state
instinct in the Constitution and First Amendment [is] the inherent incapacity of political government to concern itself with
religious matters." I reject what he submits, and submit in its
place that his statement is shown to be false by the record of the
First Congress and by the relevant history, legislative, executive
and judicial, from 1791 to 1947.
Dr. Pfeffer asserts that "the generation which adopted the
Constitution and the Amendment was committed to the proposition
that excluded from the powers delegated to the political state any
power over religion." What that generation wrote and adopted,
which seems to me better evidence as to their beliefs than Dr.
Pfeffer's unsupported assumption, was that power to pass laws
concerning an establishment of religion (for the United States as
a whole, of course) or to prohibit freedom of religion, was excluded
from the powers of the Federal Congress, not the political state.
This is the constitutional principle (not Dr. Pfeffer's phrasing
of the modern substitute) -whichwas, and still is, held substantially
without exception by all the American people.
Dr. Pfeffer uses rather loaded words in his argument: "Intervention in religious affairs," "Religion was beyond the jurisdiction of the State," and he quotes from Madison that the federal
government did not have "a shadow of right to intermeddle with
religion."- Of course, the federal government had no right to
intermeddle with religion. No one is contending, so far as I know,
that the government should intermeddle, with religion, or that it
should have jurisdiction over religion, or that it should intervene
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in religious affairs. Jurisdiction means, according to Webster,
"the legal power, right, or authority to hear and determine a cause
or causes considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter." Jurisdiction is "the authority of a sovereign
power to govern or legislate." Authority is "legal or rightful
power; a right to command or act; dominion, jurisdiction." To
meddle is "to concern one's self improperly or impertinently with
the affairs of others." So far as I know, no one in America today
advocates the establishment of any religion, or government authority or jurisdiction over, or power to intermeddle or intervene in
religious affairs.
Dr. Pfeffer remarks that when the Constitutional Convention
convened in Philadelphia in 1787, the overwhelming majority of
Americans accepted the proposition that religion was a personal,
not political, matter. Quite true, and so far as I know, practically
every American today believes the same thing. Apparently all
Americans have held this constantly throughout our history, while
the federal government and all state governments have been granting, in one form or another, various types of non-preferential aid
to religion. Tax exemption for all religious institutions, churches,
synagogues, schools, hospitals, etc. is certainly no indication that
Americans believe that religion is a political matter. Courtship is
a personal, not a political matter, but the United States government
aids lovers by carrying their ardent epistles from New York to
San Francisco for three cents. The idea that the government cannot assist citizens impartially in other than political matters is
absurd. Health, too, is as much a personal, and not a political matter, as is religion.
Dr. Pfeffer must obviously be in error when he says that "it
was a widespread belief in 1791, both among religionists and
rationalists, that no political state had the rightful power to deal
with religion on a preferential or non-preferential basis." This is
clearly denied by the fact that every American political state (that
is, all of the states in the Union, plus the federal government)
has exercised the power to deal with religion in various ways from
the beginning down -to date. In fact, the Rutledge doctrine which
Dr. Pfeffer is supporting, of "absolute and complete separation
between the spheres of civic authority and religious activity," is
a fantastic, modern theory which apparently never occurred to
any American until about a decade ago. As a political theory, it
is totally unrealistic. No civilized government on earth has ever
expressed that theory in words in its constitution and laws, nor has
any civilized government on earth ever followed it in action and
policy. The idea that political government cannot deal with religion but can deal with education, manufacturing, transportation,
276

THE MEANING OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
medicine, farming, and everything else under the sun, seems to
me so thoroughly absurd that it is not surprising that no civilized
government on earth has ever accepted it, either in theory or in
practice.
So far as I know, no one contends that the First Amendment
granted the Congress any power whatever. I make no such contention. The language stated. the absence of power in Congress to
legislate in any way, either for or against, "an establishment of
religion." A specific subject was named and the world was informed that Congress could not legislate on that subject. Dr.
Pfeffer contends, "This language carried with it a prohibition
almost unlimited in scope." I am sorry he did not pause at this
point to explain how a prohibition of action on a specific topic
could possibly be a prohibition almost unlimited in scope. His
only attempt at justifying this is to assert that it was in substance
a prohibition of any legislation on the subject of religion. That I
think would take a bit of proving which I do not find in Dr. Pfeffer 's
argument. I do not see how anyone can believe that the First
Congress adopted a statement that Congress had no power to legislate on religion and then immediately began to legislate on religion.
They provided for chaplains in the House and Senate, chaplains
in the armed forces, and missionaries to teach religion to the
Indians. How can these facts, and all the other evidence which I
submitted in my main article, be reconciled with such a theory?
The idea that "an establishment of religion" means the same thing
as "religion" is nonsense, and nonsense of the sort that James
Madison could never have written or accepted. In my main argument I dealt with Madison's two carelessly phrased veto messages.
Since the implications which Dr. Pfeffer seeks to draw from these
two paragraphs are inconsistent with Madison's total record, in
the First Congress, as President, and as a citizen of Virginia, and
since presidential messages do not overrule the provision of the
Constitution, anyway, it seems unnecessary to repeat a discussion
of these veto messages here.
Dr. Pfeffer is again guilty of inaccurate reporting when he says
that Jefferson considered a presidential Thanksgiving proclamation as a law respecting an establishment of religion. That was
not what Jefferson said, and Dr. Pfeffer offers no proof that Jefferson ever thought of such a thing. These are Jefferson's words in
his letter to the Reverend Samuel Miller, to which Dr. Pfeffer
refers: "I consider the government of the United States as
interdicted by the Constitution from intermeddling with religious
institutions, their doctrines, discipline or exercises . ... Certainly,
no power to prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume authority
in religious discipline, has been delegated to the general gov-
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eminent . ..But it is only proposed that I should recommend,
not prescribe, a day of fasting and prayer. That is, that I should
indirectly assume to the United States an authority over religious
exercises
. . Fasting and prayer are religious exercises; the
enjoining of them an act of discipline. Every religious society has
a right to determine for itself the times for these exercises; and
the objects proper for them, according to their own particular
tenets; and this right can never be safer than in their own hands,
where the Constitution has deposited it." And Jefferson added
that he had "no authority to direct the religious exercises of his
constituents."
Here Jefferson was expressing his central idea in his many
discussions of the relations of government with religion. He
objected to the government interfering with religious exercises,
discipline, ritual, or worship, and he objected to the punishment
of people who did not conform to the government's theory of what
was correct in these religious affairs. This is always Jefferson's
thesis. Neither Justice Rutledge nor Dr. Pfeffer, nor any of the
other protagonists for the modern substitute for the First Amendment, have ever cited a single instance in which Thomas Jefferson
specifically objected to the use of impartial government aid in support of religious activities. In his long life as a citizen of Virginia,
he never protested against Virginia doing it; and as President of
the United States for eight years he did it throughout his administration.
Dr. Pfeffer tries to make something out of the fact that the
Blaine amendment (essentially to introduce the Rutledge doctrine
into the Constitution) received a majority vote in both Houses,
but fell short of the necessary two thirds vote in the Senate. He
does not mention the fate of the other -19 or 20 proposals to the
same effect which never got even this far in Congress. Senator
Blaine was one of the greatest Congressional leaders in American
history. He was operating at the time of tremendous power of the
Republican party which he represented. Both Presidents Grant
and Garfield had much the same idea that Senator Blaine expressed
in this amendment. With all that power behind the amendment,
it went further than any of the other proposals, but not far enough.
As I have shown, Congress has either turned down, or allowed to
die in committee, some twenty proposals to put the RutledgePfeffer doctrine into the Constitution. The fact that one out of
twenty got a sufficient vote in one House of Congress is not impressive evidence that the American people and their official representatives believe in the Rutledge-Pfeffer doctrine.
I submit that Dr. Pfeffer has presented no valid evidence that
the establishment clause forbids non-preferential government aid
to religion.

